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ABSTRACT
Over the last couple of decades in the lending industry, nancial
disintermediation has occurred on a global scale. Traditionally, even
for small supply of funds, banks would act as the conduit between
the funds and the borrowers. It has now been possible to overcome
some of the obstacles associated with such supply of funds with
the advent of online platforms like Kiva, Prosper, LendingClub.
Kiva for example, works with Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) in
developing countries to build Internet proles of borrowers with
a brief biography, loan requested, loan term, and purpose. Kiva,
in particular, allows lenders to fund projects in dierent sectors
through group or individual funding. Traditional research studies
have investigated various factors behind lender preferences purely
from the perspective of loan aributes and only until recently have
some cross-country cultural preferences been investigated. In this
paper, we investigate lender perceptions of economic factors of the
borrower countries in relation to their preferences towards loans
associated with dierent sectors. We nd that the inuence from
economic factors and loan aributes can have substantially dierent
roles to play for dierent sectors in achieving faster funding. We
formally investigate and quantify the hidden biases prevalent in
dierent loan sectors using recent tools from causal inference and
regression models that rely on Bayesian variable selection methods.
We then extend these models to incorporate fairness constraints
based on our empirical analysis and nd that such models can still
achieve near comparable results with respect to baseline regression
models.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online lending in recent years has been considered to be an im-
portant contributor to nancial restructuring in developing and
underdeveloped nations by way of opening access to alternate
sources of funding for them [4]. Online platforms that enable such
peer-to-peer transactions whereby certain groups of people invest
in projects from poor entrepreneurs, have become very popular.
ese online platforms thus form an integral component of the
credit disbursement process that was envisioned for micronance.
ere exist dierent types of microlending services including for-
prot lending services like LendingClub, Prosper and the pro-social
platforms like Kiva1 where the lenders oer interest-free money
to the borrowers. Platforms like Kiva are benecial to borrowers,
since lenders typically are risk-free indicating they do not expect
any interest returns for the loan and hence can select their portfolio
being less biased. Additionally, such pro-social platforms overcome
the biases in loan disbursement through auctions in online plat-
forms which is unfavorably inclined towards the credit-trustworthy
users and undermines new users [10].
ere have been a few studies conducted that debate whether
such platforms have been successful in reaching countries where it
would otherwise have been dicult to execute such peer lending
strategies in an oine manner [1, 28]. Successful mechanisms for
peer lending come from both sides: the lender geing its expected
return and the borrower nishing the project and repaying the
loan. And to enable such successful mechanisms for lending, there
has been considerable research in machine learning models that
recommend projects to lenders [11, 26], and to predict the dynamics
of the crowdfunding [30]. is makes it imperative to understand
whether there exists any bias when it comes to lenders selecting
loans based on certain observable aributes and in presence of
externalities like lender’s perception of the economy.
Broadly, there have been a few groups of research studies con-
ducted on understanding and promoting micronance lending on
such platforms. (1) Investigating biases: previous studies have fo-
cused on understanding and predicting bilateral trade transactions
based on migration and GDP dierences between country pairs.
e goal here has been to investigate the presence of lender level
preferences towards countries [28]. (2) Borrower and lender fea-
tures: past studies include understanding various platform-external
lender and borrower personal and regional characteristics that fa-
cilitate the transactions between countries [11, 24] and the role of
matching characteristics. However, the loan aribute concerning
the loan sector is oen overlooked especially to its connections to
philanthropic and pro-social motivations of investors. Such detailed
1hp://www.kiva.org
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connections of the loan sector on funding propensity have been
investigated in [19], (3) Fairness aware lending: recent studies have
acknowledged the existence of bias in lending models and the need
to diversify the distribution of donations to reduce the inequality
of loans [15], and (4) Social networks: the role of networks have
been studied from the perspective of facilitating bidding behavior
in platforms where the investors stand to prot from their lending
[17]. Similarly, teams and group loans have been understood to
have a more positive eect on gaining traction from lenders as have
been studied in [25].
What is oen overlooked is the inuence of external factors per-
taining to the borrower countries that inuence lender preferences
and which cannot be directly observed from the platform data. Fur-
thermore, there has been substantial evidence in the recent past that
supports Lucas paradox, which indicates that, counter-intuitively
the liberalization of international capital regimes using the inter-
net platforms has not produced an open club, rather a rich club,
a group of countries that exhibit the country-pair bias [1]. Since
recommendation models typically do not consider such external
data while building their models [26], such latent biases arising
from external factors including lender perceptions of countries2
can be quite detrimental for certain projects especially ones from
specic countries.
To this end, we investigate the factors behind the funding speed
of loans using the dataset available from Kiva. e goal is to see
whether the lenders fall for region specic economic factors that
they expect would help them avoid loan defaults from borrowers
and whether that aects funding projects in certain sectors. We
compare the eect of dierent sectors on project funding times
when the economic external factors form part of the models in
consideration. Using data from 143,856 loans over a period of 4
years and economic indicators from World Bank Data, we make
the following contributions:
• We gather data from Kiva loans and heterogeneous data
sources and build regression models to estimate the impact
of such factors on the funding speed. We observe the role
of the project or loan sector as a sensitive aribute in the
models especially when its correlation with the funding
speed diers for dierent sectors.
• We use recent causal inference and machine learning tools
to estimate the eects the sector aribute on funding times.
We specically nd that loans catering to Retail are funded
4 days slower relative to the other sectors on aggregate
and loans for Arts are funded 6 days faster - all these when
considering the economic factors of the location of the
borrowers and the loan aributes. is is in contrast to
observations from data that do not reveal such hidden
discrepancies when excluding external factors.
• Following this, we incorporate fairness driven constraints
to mitigate some of the biases arising from these loan spe-
cic aributes for particular sectors of loans. Our results
suggest that even with such fairness constraints, the model
performances are not too far-o from baselines, thus giv-
ing hope for future systems that take into account such
constraints.
2hps://bit.ly/2LF9Mpp
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Figure 1: Distribution of (a) average funding times, (b) num-
ber of loans, (c) average loan amount by loan sectors and (d)
number of borrower countries by each sector.
We note that this is the rst work in aempting to understand
the existing biases from loan aributes when external factors are
also considered to be the contributors to such decisive disparities.
roughout our work, we mainly focus on linear regression models,
however we adopt the models to use Bayesian variable selection
techniques that not only ts the regression models while simulta-
neously picking the most eective regressors, but also allows us
to incorporate any prior beliefs about the aributes of the projects
and the users that cannot generally be accomplished with standard
regression models.
2 DATA
Kiva is a non-prot micro-nancial organization and its lending
model is based on crowdfunding in which any individual can fund
a particular loan by contributing to a loan individually or as a part
of a lender team. e choice behind this platform is driven by the
motivation to test a few hypotheses in this research - we want to be
able to understand the presence or absence of behavioral and social
bias that could create preferences for certain projects. Since public
perceptions of societies can elicit biases towards countries with
specic geographical, cultural or political fabric and that can aect
funding in such online platforms, we set out to test the interplay
of economic externalities and the loan specic aributes in such
seings.
e publicly available Kiva dataset3 contains various entities: (1)
the data for the loans that contains various aributes associated
with the borrowers, (2) the lenders’ information containing various
aributes regarding a lender’s history of funding projects (3) the
borrowers’ information containing various aributes regarding a
borrower’s project and repayment history, (4) eld partner which
acts as the mediator and allocates loans from the lenders to the
3hps://www.kiva.org/build/data-snapshots
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# Loans # Lender Countries # Borrower Countries
143856 216 57
# Languages Avg. Loan Amount (USD) Avg. Funding Time (std)
7 836.18 12.58 (14.6)
Table 1: Basic statistics for loans used in our study
borrowers. Since our objective in this study is to understand the
role of developmental factors when paired with the sector that
receives the most funding, we use the following aributes that
are associated with a loan in Kiva’s platform from January 2010
to December 2014: (1) sector: categorical aribute denoting the
sector of loan activity. e sectors considered in our study aer
removing for sparse data is shown in Figure 1. Note that the set of
sector tags are xed for all loans and are not randomly generated.
(2) currency policy - binary aribute to reduce risk of currency
uctuation4, (3) language - the language of the loan description -
since 70% of the loans we considered were in English, we converted
this to a binary aribute by considering all non-English languages
as one category, (4) loan amount - numerical aribute denoting
the amount of loan requested for the project, (5) borrower gender
- binary aribute denoting the gender of the borrower, and (6)
funding time - this is a derived numerical aribute calculated as
the dierence between the time of the loan request and the time
when it was fully funded. We use this aribute for measuring
the preference of the investors towards particular projects and
our models are based on understanding what aributes account
for lesser funding times. We plot the distribution of the funding
times and the number of loans by sectors in our dataset in Figure 1.
However, unlike similar analyses, we do not found any substantial
dierence in the average loan amounts by sectors that get funded.
Apart from entertainment, most of the sectors have similar funding
requests that ultimately get funded.
As a rst task, we try to investigate the causal eects of borrower-
lender dierences arising from lender perceptions of the borrower
countries as well as implicit economic and cultural variations. We
try to measure the extent of impact it has on the funding times
when considered alongside the sector of the loans. To this end,
for each loan, we gather the following data from the world bank
metrics dating back to 2010 [5]. We gather the following aributes:
(1) ease of business: an ordinal aribute denoting the rank of the
borrower country for ease of business, (2) loan access - numerical
aribute denoting the ease of access to loan in the borrower country
through formal nancial institutions, (3) women ratio - numerical
aribute measuring the ratio of women in labor force compared to
men, (4) aordability - numerical aribute pertaining to the costs
associated with using services, including both interest rates and
fees, (5) VC nancing - ordinal aribute that indicates how easy
it is for the borrower to seek capital locally or otherwise in their
country, (6) capacity innovation - ordinal aribute denoting the
capacity of people in the borrower country to innovate and (7)
internet penetration - numerical aribute denoting the percentage
of people in the borrower country using the internet. To measure
the cross-cultural similarities, we proceed as done in [28] to use
the following features: (8) colonization - binary aribute denoting
whether the borrower country was colonized by lender country,
4hps://pages.kiva.org/blog/new-kiva-feature-currency-risk-protection
OLS Estimates M1 M2(Sector)
M3
(Services)
M4
(Agri.)
M5
(Retail)
Intercept 21.0346 20.2312 22.3927 20.4209 19.9626
Sector -1.5268 -0.5921 2.3072
Currency
Policy[T.shared] -1.0349 -1.1697 -3.2858 -0.894 -0.2923
Language -2.5225 -2.0611 -1.3739 -2.1189 -2.3513
Ease of business -0.0313 -0.027 -0.0309 -0.0282 -0.0281
Colonization -1.6048 -2.0484 1.5085 -3.7422 -0.8401
Borrower Gender
[T.female] -4.2708 -4.609 -4.4875 -4.1959 -4.7179
Loan Amount 3.8751 4.1365 3.6231 5.1564 3.6773
Distance -0.7032 -0.6359 -0.6739 -0.8225 -0.3331
Migrants -2.1397 -2.4934 -1.9945 -2.3797 -2.4833
GDP Dierence -0.3162 -0.2086 -0.0415 -0.2439 0.0622
Loan Access -1.2037 -0.526 1.619 -1.582 0.2476
Women Ratio -2.9224 -3.2598 -2.1065 -2.0469 -3.3524
Aordability -2.2799 -2.2284 2.4288 -2.2366 -2.7703
VC nance 2.2952 2.0675 0.4367 2.3493 1.042
Capacity innov. -0.0378 -0.0177 0.5504 0.5695 -0.0052
Internet Pen. -0.2639 0.4767 0.7634 -1.3048 0.9828
Table 2: Table: OLS Regression estimates on funding time
for a project loan. For model M1, we do not include the Sec-
tor attribute and for model M2, the attribute Sector (categor-
ical) is used as the dummy variable.
(9) distance - geographical distance between borrower and lender
countries obtained from [20], (10) migrants - numerical aribute
that measures the number of people or borrower country origin
living in the lender country obtained from world bank data and (11)
GDP dierence - numerical aribute denoting the GDP Dierence
between borrower and lender countries obtained from world bank
data. For the derived aributes which were calculated based on
borrower and lender countries, we used the following method:
for numerical aributes, for a specic loan we took the average
of all the borrower-lender pairs for that loan. For categorical or
binary aributes like colonization, we randomly picked one of
the borrower-lender pairs for that loan and used that for the loan
feature. is however introduces some approximation into the
feature measurements. For all numerical aributes, we performed
standardization for the regressionmodels which would be described
henceforth.
e dataset is publicly available for download5. Aer merging
the data from these heterogeneous sources, we list the basic sta-
tistics of the loans used in this study and is shown in Table 1. We
nd that while the average funding time is 12.5 days, the standard
deviation is 14.6 days, which demands further investigation behind
the variations.
3 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL
DISPARITIES
We begin with a simple linear regression model to investigate the
importance that these economic indicators capturing the borrower’s
nations, have on the funding time and how they play a role com-
pared to the loan sector. When we regress the variables of the
economic factors and the loan aributes barring the loan sector,
5hps://bit.ly/2TnqhL7
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on the funding time denoted by modelM1, we nd from Table 2
instantly that there are some borrower-lender aributes that have
a larger role to play - the distance, and GDP dierence have a neg-
ligible impact on the funding time whereas the feature measuring
the migrants of borrower country in lender country has a negative
correlation with funding times - it suggests that the cultural simi-
larities arising from cross-border migration results towards faster
funding for borrowers with such cultural advantages. Similarly, the
women ratio factor has a signicant negative correlation on the
funding time along with the borrower gender in line with previous
research [1]. is indicates that the perception about the role of
women in such economies is a signicant driver towards deciding
whether the project would receive faster funding. is is also sup-
ported by the observation that the borrowers’ gender shares such a
correlation when regressed with the female category as the positive
category in the binary aribute.
Next, we include the project sector aribute in the regression
model as a dummy variable with the corresponding one-hot encod-
ings denoted by modelM2. We observe that while there are minor
changes in the magnitude of the coecients, the correlations of
these variables do not change in the presence of the sector variable.
is tempts us to conclude that when recommendation systems rely
on these aributes to predict the best projects in terms of having
beer chances of funding, they can make a prey fair classication
for all projects based on these aributes. However, upon closer
analyses, we look into the eect that these aributes have when
considering each sector at a time. Taking each loan sector cate-
gory s as the main category in contention, we build sector specic
models. For a model on sector s , we consider all loans belonging
to s as one category and all other categories as a unied dummy
sector category separate from the sector s . We build regression
models for all 12 sectors in a similar fashion. We show four of the
models corresponding to four dierent sectors in Table 2 - in model
M3 we convert the multi-category sector aribute into a binary
category by considering the services sector and loans belonging
to that category as one cluster and all the other loans belonging
to other sectors as the other cluster. When we compare M3 with
modelM4 catering to the agriculture sector, we can observe that
not only do some of the aributes dier in the magnitude signi-
cantly, but the inuence from the aributes also reverses in some
cases. Particularly, we nd that the inuence from the aribute
colonization has opposite eects for the two sectors and similarly
for aributes like aordability and loan access.
When comparing the role of sectors, we observe that the coef-
cient magnitude demonstrates that the relative number of days
by which each sector gets funded faster or slower relative to the
other sectors. However, the fact that these results are also heavily
aected by the varying sparsity of the data. is leads us to turn
our aention to recent literature on more robust causal reasoning
tools that allow for explaining the eect of sectors on funding speed
in the presence of such externalities [2, 25]. We will compare these
results later with those obtained from causal reasoning based mech-
anisms and show how the disparity calls for controlling existing
biases among the sectors.
4 CAUSAL INFERENCE
Note that the treatment of interest here is the loan sector assignment
for the loan requested and we are interested in estimating the
eects of loan sector relative to the economic, cultural and other
loan characteristics, on the funding time. Following the work done
in [25], we would use the Robin Causal Model or the Potential
Outcome Framework to estimate the treatment eects.
4.1 Treatment Eects Indicators
We describe in this section how we measure the causal impact
metrics for each sector s . We estimate the treatment eects of
sector on loan funding time considering separate models for each
sector and treating the whole batch of data separately for each
sector. Let the features be denoted by X , which in our case are all
the aributes except the project sector s . Let Y be the outcome of
interest, in our case the funding time of the loans. For each sector s ,
we considerW to be the binary treatment variable (whether a loan
belongs to s or not). Following this, for each sector s , we represent
the dataset in the form (Yi ,Xi ,Wi )ni=1, whereWi denotes whether
the sector for loan i is s or not (W1 = 1 when loan belongs to s),
n denoting the number of loans in the data. Note thatWi would
be dierent for loan i when considering dierent sectors since the
observational data gives us the actual loan sector. We will drop
the subscripts fromW when generalizing the inference seings
for all loans. We will also refrain from aaching s as sub/super-
scripts to notations since we perform all the following steps and
estimate models in the same was irrespective of the sectors. We are
interested in estimating the average treatment eects (ATE) ofW
on Y for each sector s and this is given by:
τ = E[Y (1) − Y (0)] (1)
whereY (1) is the potential outcome of a loan that belongs to s while
Y (0) is the one that does not belong to s. However, in the data, only
one of them is observed for each loan when considering models for
a specic sector. e hree assumptions that are made during this
estimation procedure are: (1) (SUTVA) - e apriori assumption
that the value of Yi when instance i is exposed to treatmentWi
will be the same, no maer what mechanism is used to assign the
treatment to i and no maer what treatments others receive, (2) the
probability of outcome Yi is independent of the features Xi given
Wi - it means that the features Xi do not simultaneously aectWi
and Yi . In our case this is more intuitive since rstly the external
economic factors in itself have no bearing on the choice of the loan
sectors and secondly, the loan sector also has lile in relation to
other loan features like gender, loan amount, and (3) both treatment
and control groups have has at least one instance assigned to them
(see [21, 25] for more details on these assumptions).
4.2 Estimating Treatment Eects
With recent advances in machine learning to create estimators for
ATE [3, 6, 12], we use the Doubly Robust Estimator (DRE) [14, 27] to
measure τ . We briey lay out the steps for estimating τ using DRE
for our data - note we follow these steps for all sectors individually:
(1) OutcomeModel - For loan sector s , we consider the loans
i belonging to s as havingWi=1 and all other loans asWi=0.
en we use the treated data {i : Wi = 1} to estimate
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µ(1,x) = E[Y (1)|X = x] with estimator µˆ(1,x) and use
control data {i :Wi = 0} to estimate µ(0,x) = E[Y (0)|X =
x] with estimator µˆ(0,x).
(2) Propensity Score Model: We then estimate the propen-
sity score model - use all loans data to estimate e(x) =
P(W = 1|X = x) with estimator eˆ(x).
(3) e DRE τˆDRE is given by
τˆDRE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
Wi × Yi − µˆ(1,Xi )
eˆ(Xi )
−(1 −Wi ) × Yi − µˆ(0,Xi )1 − eˆ(Xi ) − µˆ(1,Xi ) − µˆ(0,Xi )
]
(4) e standard error is then estimated following [18] by us-
ing an empirical sandwich estimator. For each instance/loan
i , we have
ICi =Wi × Yi − µˆ(1,Xi )
eˆ(Xi ) − (1 −Wi ) ×
Yi − µˆ(0,Xi )
1 − eˆ(Xi )
+µˆ(1,Xi ) − µˆ(0,Xi ) − τˆDRE
andσ 2 = 1n
∑n
i=1 IC
2
i . e standard error is estimated as
σ√
n
.
e 95% condence interval of τ is estimated by (τˆDRE −
z0.975 σ√n , τˆDRE + z0.975
σ√
n
).
e DRE has the double robustness property: given that either
the outcome model or the propensity score model or both are cor-
rectly specied, the estimator is consistent. In the following subsec-
tions, we briey outline the techniques we adopt for these 4 steps
mentioned.
4.3 Learning Outcome Models
In order to estimate µˆ(1,x) and µˆ(0,x) for each sector s , we use
regression models, however we observe from Table 2 that not all
variables are equally important when measuring their outcome on
funding times and these dier substantially among the sectors. To
this end, we adopt some variable selection techniqueswhile building
separate regression models for µˆ(1,x) and µˆ(0,x) for a sector s . We
specically adopt Bayesian methods where sparsity can be favored
by assuming sparsity-enforcing priors on the model coecients.
ese types of priors are characterized by density functions that
are peaked at zero and also have a large probability mass in a wide
range of non-zero values. Ideally, the posterior mean of truly zero
coecients should be shrunk towards zero. At the same time the
posterior mean of non-zero coecients should remain unaected
by the assumed prior. We use spike-and-slab priors which have
some advantages when compared to other sparsity enforcing priors
like Laplace and Students t priors [23]. e advantage of Bayesian
methods in such seings is that it allows us to also get credible
intervals on the posterior estimates of the model coecients and it
allows us to easily incorporate some additional constraints in the
priors which we will discuss in the later sections. We briey review
the spike-and-slab model [13] as the regression model in choice
and we learn separate models for µˆ(1,x) and µˆ(0,x) for a specic
sector.
Let y ∈ Rn×1 be an n-dimensional row vector denoting the
target variable and X ∈ Rn×p denote the design matrix, p denoting
the number of aributes in our model except the sector aribute.
Briey, the spike-and-slab model species the prior hierarchy in
the following way:
yi ∼ N (βxi ,σ 2)
βi ∼ (1 − pii )δ0 + piiN (0,σ 2τ 2)
τ 2 ∼ Inverse-Gamma(12 ,
s2
2 )
pii ∼ Bern(θ )
θ ∼ Beta(a,b)
σ 2 ∼ Inverse-Gamma(α1,α2)
(2)
where i ∈ [1,p] indexes the features in the regression model, β
denotes the coecients in the regression model. e rst equation
denes a regression model where the response yi follows a normal
distribution conditioned on xi and the parameters β . e normal
distribution has a variance σ 2. e second equation models the
way in which sparsity is enforced on the model coecients. e
sparsity of β can be favored by assuming a spike-and-slab prior
for the components of this vector - the slab N (0,σ 2τ 2) is a zero
mean broad Gaussian whose variance τ 2 is large and the scale σ 2 is
multiplied so that the prior scales with outcome. e spike δ0 is a
Dirac Delta function (point probability mass) centered at 0 and this
component is responsible for deciding whether the posterior for
these coecients would be zeroed out. pi ∈ [0, 1] is amixture weight
between the spike-and-slab components in the prior. e rest of
the equations denote the hierarchical structure of the parameters
σ 2, τ 2 and pi . Note that τ 2 and θ are common to all predictors
.We now briey describe how we sample the parameters using the
Gibbs sampling technique for generating markov chain traces. e
details of the sampling procedure have been added to the Appendix
section.
Sampling θ
To sample the conditional posterior p(θ |y, β,pi ,τ 2,σ 2)= p(θ |pi ), we
calculate the following as: p(θ |pi ) = θ
a+
∑p
i=1 pii −1(1−θ )b+
∑n
i=1(1−pii )−1∫
θa+
∑p
i=1 pii −1(1−θ )b+
∑n
i=1(1−pii )−1dθ
where B is the beta function. e posterior is θ |pi ∼ Beta
(
a +∑p
i=1 pii ,b +
∑n
i=1(1 − pii )
)
.
Sampling τ 2
e conditional posterior of τ 2 can be derived from the probability
p(τ 2 |y, β ,pi ,θ ,σ 2)= p(τ 2 |pi , β).
Here since pi can assume values 0 or 1 we tackle each case inde-
pendently and derive the following. We sample from the prior if all
pii ’s are zero. Let pi={pi1, . . . ,pip } be the vector of mixture weights
and let 0 be a vector of zeros of length p. Following this, we have
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p(τ 2 |pi , β) = 1
Z
p(β |τ 2,pi )p(pi )p(τ 2)
=
1
Z
p∏
i=1
pii (2piσ 2τ 2)−
1
2 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2τ 2
βT β
)
(
s2
2
) 1
2
Γ
(
1
2
) (τ 2)− 12−1exp ( − s22
τ 2
) (3)
which is a Gamma distribution and therefore we sample τ 2 |β ,pi
∼ Inverse-Gamma( 12 +
∑p
i=1 pii
2 ,
s2
2 +
βT β
2σ 2 ). On the other hand, when
pi = 0, the βi ’s are 0 and we simply sample from the prior τ 2 |β ,pi
∼ Inverse-Gamma( 12 , s
2
2 ).
Sampling σ 2
e conditional posterior of τ 2 can be derived in a similar manner
as above from the probability p(σ 2 |y, β,pi ,θ ,σ 2)= p(σ 2 |y, β). Pro-
ceeding as before, we can derive the sampling as follows: σ 2 |y, β
∼ Gamma
(
α1 + n2 ,α2 +
(y−Xβ )T (y−Xβ )
2
)
.
Sampling β
Proceeding as before, when all pii ’s are zero, the corresponding
βi ’s are all sampled from the Dirac Delta function δo resulting
in all zeros. For non-zero vector pi = {pi1, . . . pip }, the conditional
posterior of β is obtained as follows:
p(β |y,pi ,σ 2,τ 2) == 1
Z
exp
(
− 12
(
β −
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
XT y
1
σ 2
)T
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
) (
β −
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
XT y
1
σ 2
))
Since this is the kernel of a Gaussian distribution, we can now
sample all βi ’s as follows
βi |y,pii ,σ 2,τ 2 ∼

δ0 ,pii = 0
N
((
XTX 1σ 2 + I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
XT y 1σ 2 ,(
XTX 1σ 2 + I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1)
,pii = 1
(4)
Sampling pi
e individual pij ’s are conditionally independent given θ . We com-
pare two cases: one when the jth element of β is zero or pij is zero
and the other when pij=1. We denote by pi−j the state of the vari-
ables barring j. Let pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ ∼ Bern(ζj ). Let a =
p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ ) and b = pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ .
en ζj = aa+b . We then draw pij from a Bernoulli with a chance
parameter ζj and we repeat this for all predictors βj . For the case
when pij = 0,
p(pij = 0|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − X−jβ−j )T (y − X−jβ−j )
)
(1 − θ )
(5)
Sector Name Treatment(RMSE)
Control
(RMSE) p - score
SSR LR SSR LR F1 Acc. %
Manufacturing 12.34 12.39 5.44 5.38 0.68 64.84
Transportation 12.68 12.83 13.98 14.17 0.69 61.76
Clothing 10.01 10.01 4.89 5.02 0.64 62.52
Personal Use 9.84 10 10.71 10.84 0.65 64.32
Housing 12.1 12.23 11.79 11.93 0.68 60
Food 11.42 11.61 10.17 10.36 0.69 66.96
Arts 11.11 11.21 12.03 12.11 0.7 59.69
Retail 11.35 11.69 11.32 11.45 0.74 71.82
Construction 10.15 10.21 10.15 10.21 0.7 69.33
Agriculture 10.66 10.75 11.39 11.55 0.71 62.89
Services 12.72 12.94 12.83 13 0.74 68.35
Education 12.57 12.67 6.18 6.36 0.66 61.05
Table 3: Result comparison on the test set. For p-score es-
timation, we use F1 score and accuracy (the higher, the bet-
ter); for outcome estimations, we use RMSE (the lower the
better).
where we have absorbed all the irrelevant terms into Z , the normal-
izing constant. e expression for pij = 1 can be wrien similarly
except that it would require integration over βj . Dening z =
y − X−jβ−j , we have
p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
θ (2piσ 2τ 2)− 12 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − X−jβ−j )T (y − X−jβ−j )
)
exp
( (∑ni=1 xizi )2
2σ 2(∑ni=1 x2i + 1τ 2 )
) (6)
e conditional posterior of pi = 0 is therefore a Bernoulli distri-
bution with chance parameter
1 − ζj = 1 − θ
(σ 2τ 2)− 12 exp(K)
(
σ 2
(∑ni=1 x 2i + 1τ 2 )
) 1
2
θ + (1 − θ ) (7)
where K = (
∑n
i=1 xizi )2
2σ 2(∑ni=1 x 2i + 1tau2 ) and where zj changes depending on
which βj we sample.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we rst start by evaluating the eectiveness of
the learning methods in modeling individual estimators that form
the components of τˆDRE . e outcome models through spike-and-
slab Bayesian variable selection models have been described in
the previous sections. For estimating the propensity score e(x) =
P(W = 1|X = x)with estimator eˆ(x) in step 2 outlined in Section 4.2,
we use a logistic regression model with the same aributes as the
outcome model. We further experimented with Random Forests,
but did not observe any substantial dierence in the results. For the
Gibbs sampling procedure, we set the following hyper-parameter
values: a = b = 1, a1 = a2 = 0.01, θ=0.5 and s = 1/2 for all
the models. We use a burn-in of 1000 samples for the procedure
and use 4000 samples for the sampling procedure. We use these
posterior estimates as the coecient estimates in the spike-and-slab
regression model for predictive purposes.
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Naive Baseline DRE (SSR)
Sector Name ATE std ATE std ATE std
Construction 1.04 0.28 -0.09 0.27 0.51 0.29
Clothing 1.85 0.16 3.12 0.15 2.63 0.29
Retail 0.59 0.15 3.25 0.15 4.81* 0.18
Education -4.86 0.2 -5.48 0.19 -5.37 0.19
Services -0.52 0.15 -0.92 0.14 -0.85 0.15
Manufacturing -5.16 0.25 -5.53 0.23 -5.38 0.24
Transportation 1.34 0.22 1.6 0.2 1.05 0.22
Agriculture -0.61 0.16 -0.28 0.15 -0.6 0.15
Housing 6.34 0.19 6.77 0.18 7.9* 0.22
Arts -5.46 0.23 -5.4 0.22 -5.61 0.26
Personal Use 1.61 0.27 1.35 0.25 -2.26* 0.71
Food -1.43 0.15 0.34 0.14 -0.4 0.17
Table 4: Summary of ATE Estimation for dierent sectors
comparing models. Numbers marked in asterisk indicate
substantial dierences in the estimates from the regression
coecients estimated in Table 2
.As mentioned before, for each sector, we consider treated and
control groups considering that sector and evaluate the outcome
models for treatment and control and the propensity score (p-score)
models. We use Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) for the outcome
regression models and F1 sore and Accuracy for the p-score model
using logistic regression. For each model we split the data into
70%-30% train-test and evaluate the models using these metrics on
the held-out test set. e results shown for all sectors in Table 3
compares Linear Regression (LR) without any regularization with
the Spike and Slab (SSR) model. We nd that while for most sectors
the models fare comparably for both treated and control groups, for
3 sectors namely Manufacturing, Clothing and Education where the
regression models for Treatment are an order of magnitude worse
than control groups evidenced by their RMSE scores. is can be
aributed to the relatively low number of projects in these areas
shown in Figure 1. We also nd that the SSR model outperforms the
LR model in most cases in terms of lower RMSE scores for the SSR
model. For the p-score model, we nd that the logistic regression
model performs similar for most sectors showing lesser disparity
among the several models used for the purpose.
Next, we compare the ATE for dierent sectors against a model
where the ATE is estimated with just the target variable - the fund-
ing time. We compare 3 models for measuring the Average Treat-
ment Eect (ATE):
(1) Naive - ATE is calculated using the dierences in means
of Y for treatment and control groups, and the standard
deviation is calculated using the group standard deviations.
(2) Baseline - Here we use the Linear Regression (LR) model
as discussed above to estimate 2 relations: (1) Y (1) = Xβ1
with estimate βˆ1 using the treated data and Y (0) = Xβ0
with estimate βˆ0 using the control data. e estimator τˆ =
1
n
∑n
i=1(Yˆ1,i − Yˆ0,i ). e standard error is then calculated
as
√
var (Yi−Yˆ1,i |i :Wi=1)
nt−1 +
var (Yi−Yˆ0,i |i :Wi=0)
nt−1 .
(3) DRE (SSR) - Here we use the SSRmodels for the estimators
Yˆ1 and Yˆ0 from the treated and control data and τˆDRE and
teh standard errro is calculated as described in Section 4.2.
e results for the model is shown in Table 4. From the table, we
nd that the four sectors where the ATE from the DRE estimator is
substantially dierent from the naive estimator are Retail, Housing,
Arts and Personal Use (we keep the 3 sectors, Manufacturing, cloth-
ing and education out of our discussion since the SSR models for
the treated data in these 3 sectors were substantially worse than
control data). In fact, we nd that the funding time for Arts loans
have almost 6 days (ATE=-5.61) faster funding when compared to
all other sectors using our DRE (SSR) model, whereas the naive
estimator suggests a slower funding. is suggests that when we
combine these economic factors along with the loan aributes for
these specic sectors, the eect of this loan sector actually helps
in faster funding which in other situations would have been dif-
cult to be funded. Similarly, for the Retail loans, we nd that
funding is generally disfavored compared to other factors by being
funded slower by 5 (ATE=4.81) days. e standard errors for all the
3 models are comparable and so as such the ATE estimates can be
compared reliably across the models. ese observations suggest
that when such economic disparities or similarities exist which can
aect lender trust and perceptions of funding a project in a particu-
lar sector, biases are bound to arise. erefore, predictive models
which try to model the risk of loan defaults must also incorporate
fairness constraints to not allow favoritism towards certain sectors.
To this end, we conclude this study by modifying our SSR model to
incorporate fairness constraints.
6 CONTROLLING THE DISPARITIES FROM
SECTORS
To control the disparities arising from the dierent aributes for
dierent sectors in our regression seing, we adopt the procedure
described in [9] and incorporate the constraint in the sampling
procedure for the parameter estimates. For each sector s , we divide
the dataset as done before into two groups: D↑s and D
↓
s based on
s . e specic goal here is to build one regression model for each
sector and learn the parameters of that model while minimizing bias
associated with predicting the target variables when conditioned
over the loan sector aribute. To this end, we use the constraint
that ensures that the mean predictions for the two groups D↑s and
D
↓
s are equal irrespective of what the target or outcome exhibits.
6.1 Adding Regularization
We use the same model based on Bayesian variable selection in-
troduced in Section 4.3 with the addition of new regularization
terms. We add the sector aribute to the features X, however we
now build one single model for each sector with the entire batch
of data. We use the balanced means constraint based on the fol-
lowing criteria:
∑
(xi ,ti )∈D↑s
β .xi
|D↑s |
=
∑
(xi ,ti )∈D↓s
β .xi
|D↓s |
, whereD↑S andD
↓
S
denote control and treatment data. It denotes the constraint that
the predictions from our model should be the same for both the
treated and the control groups for the loan sector in consideration
irrespective of what the target variable dierences in the model
exhibit. Using the same notations used in Equations 2, we make
the following adjustment to sample the target variable. Denoting∑
(xi ,ti )∈D↑s
β .xi
|D↑s |
=
∑
(xi ,ti )∈D↓s
β .xi
|D↓s |
as d, we add the regularization
term as: yi ∼ N (βxi ,σ 2) + λβd, where λ is the hyper-parameter
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controlling the eect of the regularization term. With this modi-
cation, the sampling equations are modied in the following way:
Samplingσ 2: e posterior is now sampled fromσ 2 |y, β ∼ Gamma
(
α1+
n
2 ,α2 +
(y−Xβ )T (y−Xβ )+λ(βd)
2
)
Sampling β : e posterior can now be sampled from
βi |y,pii ,σ 2,τ 2 ∼

δ0 ,pii = 0
N
((
XTX 1σ 2 + I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
1
σ 2 (XT y − d)(
XTX 1σ 2 + I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1)
,pii = 1
(8)
Sampling pi : e posterior for pij can similarly be sampled. For
the case when pij = 0,
p(pij = 0|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − X−jβ−j )T (y − X−jβ−j )
+λ(βd)
)
(1 − θ )
(9)
As done before, we dene z = y − X−jβ−j as the residuals of the
regression y on X−j . Modifying Equation 22, we arrive at
p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
θ (2piσ 2τ 2)− 12 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − X−jβ−j )T (y − X−jβ−j ) + β−jd−j
)
exp
( (∑ni=1 xizi + di )2
2σ 2(∑ni=1 x2i + 1τ 2 )
) (10)
e conditional posterior of pi = 0 is therefore a Bernoulli distri-
bution with chance parameter
1 − ζj = 1 − θ
(σ 2τ 2)− 12 exp(K)
(
σ 2
(∑ni=1 x 2i + 1τ 2 )
) 1
2
θ + (1 − θ ) (11)
where K = (
∑n
i=1 xizi+d+i)2
2σ 2(∑ni=1 x 2i + 1tau2 ) and where zj changes depending on
which βj we sample.
6.2 Results
Finally, we compare the results of the models with the regulariza-
tion constraint for the sectors with models discussed prior to this.
Additionally, we also compare the results from the model in the
absence of external factors and only considering loan aributes
available from Kiva data. We adopt a similar validation approach as
previous where we peform a 70%-30% train-test split and test on the
held-out 30% data. For training the SSR models, we use the same
seings as explained in Section 5 for the Gibbs sampling procedure.
For evaluating the regression models, we use the metric RMSE on
the test data as done in the previous section. e regularization
hyper-parameter λ, we set it to 0.6 aer cross-validating it with
several values. e results have been shown in Table 5 - the column
Sector LR LR - LA SSR SSR (regularization)
Housing 10.76 11.34 10.61 13.82
Personal Use 9.6 10.02 9.46 10.24
Retail 12.06 13.18 11.91 12.73
Arts 9.31 10.25 9.19 9.52
Table 5: RMSE results of regressionmodels. Models with LA
denote only loan attributes fromKiva are used in themodel.
e lower values indicate better results.
LR-LA shows the results for the model with only loan aributes
from Kiva. e last column shows results incorporating the regu-
larization term. Additionally, we only test the models with the 4
sectors that showed the highest ATE explained in Section 5.
We observe that in all these sectors, addition of external factors
like the economic aributes and borrower-lender country pair at-
tributes improve the model over the model LR-LA. e model with
SSR performs the best in the absence of any regularization for all
the sectors having the least RMSE, indicating that variable selection
helps improve the predictions. However, when we compare these
results with the model SSR (with regularization), we nd that the
performance drops at the cost of the equality constraints, however
what we observe is that the results are still comparable to the simple
LR model. We nd that for Housing loans, the model with regular-
ization performs comparably worse and this can be aributed to
the pre-existing disparities shown by high ATE for these loans as
shown in Table 4. erefore, the equal means constraint does result
in performance degradation. However, these results suggest that
we can still build models by reducing disparities in the resulting
predictions while limiting the drop in performance.
7 RELATEDWORK
Understanding the eect of loan aributes towards funding speeds
have been studied extensively in [19] albeit only with factors from
the loans data. e eects of cultural dierences have also been
studied in [8] where the authors present evidence that lenders prefer
culturally similar borrowers in Kiva. However, the extent to which
that aects the actual interests towards particular sectors was not
presented. Our work here opens an entire body of research into
fairness aware recommendation systems [7, 16] that might be nec-
essary when promoting projects so as to lessen the inherent biases
arising from existing lenders. Especially when designing portfolio
recommendations as a tool for decision support for lenders as done
in [29], it is important to adjust the multi-objective optimization
problems incorporating constraints as described in this paper. Such
conclusions can also be extended to platforms which are designed
for lenders to prot from investments such as Lendingclub [22].
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we rst demonstrated how simple economic factors
can play a role in deciding the speed of funding for particular loans
and how they can be intertwined with the loan sector. We then
measured the existing disparities arising from such factors using
causal reasoning estimators and proposed a method to control the
dierences in outcome. One area where our work can be extended
is to develop a single model taking all models into account - this is
where the Bayesian variable selection method can be extended to
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incorporate priors that take into account fairness constraints for
all sectors and using empirical bayes to drive the priors.
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Sampling θ
To sample the conditional posterior p(θ |y, β,pi ,τ 2,σ 2)= p(θ |pi ), we
calculate the following as:
p(θ |pi ) = p(pi |θ )p(θ )∫
p(pi |θ )p(θ )dθ
=
∏
i θ
pii (1 − θ )pii 1B(a,b)θa−1(1 − θ )b−1∫ ∏
i θ
pii (1 − θ )pii 1B(a,b)θa−1(1 − θ )b−1dθ
=
θa+
∑p
i=1 pii−1(1 − θ )b+
∑n
i=1(1−pii )−1∫
θa+
∑p
i=1 pii−1(1 − θ )b+
∑n
i=1(1−pii )−1dθ
(12)
where B is the beta function and where we note that the nu-
merator in Equation 12 is the kernel of a Beta distribution and
the denominator is a normalizing constant. e posterior is θ |pi
∼ Beta
(
a +
∑p
i=1 pii ,b +
∑n
i=1(1 − pii )
)
.
Sampling τ 2
e conditional posterior of τ 2 can be derived from the probability
p(τ 2 |y, β ,pi ,θ ,σ 2)= p(τ 2 |pi , β). Proceeding as before
p(τ 2 |pi , β) = p(β |τ
2,pi )p(pi )p(τ 2)∫
p(β |τ 2,pi )p(pi )p(τ 2)dτ 2
=
p(β |τ 2,pi )p(τ 2)∫
p(β |τ 2,pi )p(τ 2)dτ 2
(13)
Here since pi can assume values 0 or 1 we tackle each case inde-
pendently and derive the following. We sample from the prior if all
pii ’s are zero. Let pi={pi1, . . . ,pip } be the vector of mixture weights
and let 0 be a vector of zeros of length p. Following this, we have
p(τ 2 |pi , β) = 1
Z
p(β |τ 2,pi )p(pi )p(τ 2)
=
1
Z
p∏
i=1
pii (2piσ 2τ 2)−
1
2 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2τ 2
βT β
)
(
s2
2
) 1
2
Γ
(
1
2
) (τ 2)− 12−1exp ( − s22
τ 2
)
=
1
Z
(τ 2)−( 12+
∑p
i=1 pii
2 )−1exp
(
−
( s22 + β
T β
2σ 2 )
τ 2
)
(14)
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which is a Gamma distribution and therefore we sample τ 2 |β ,pi
∼ Inverse-Gamma( 12 +
∑p
i=1 pii
2 ,
s2
2 +
βT β
2σ 2 ). On the other hand, when
pi = 0, the βi ’s are 0 and we simply sample from the prior τ 2 |β ,pi
∼ Inverse-Gamma( 12 , s
2
2 ).
Sampling σ 2
e conditional posterior of τ 2 can be derived in a similar man-
ner as above from the probability p(σ 2 |y, β ,pi ,θ ,σ 2)= p(σ 2 |y, β).
Proceeding as before, we expand
p(σ 2 |y, β) = 1
Z
p(y|σ 2, β)p(β)p(σ 2)
=
1
Z
(2piσ 2)− n2 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − Xβ)T (y − Xβ)
)
αα12
Γ(α1) (σ
2)−a1−1exp
(
− α2
σ 2
) (15)
which aer reductions turn out to be an inverse Gamma distri-
bution. So σ 2 |y, β ∼ Gamma
(
α1 + n2 ,α2 +
(y−Xβ )T (y−Xβ )
2
)
.
Sampling β
Proceeding as before, when all pii ’s are zero, the corresponding
βi ’s are all sampled from the Dirac Delta function δo resulting
in all zeros. For non-zero vector pi = {pi1, . . . pip }, the conditional
posterior of β is obtained as follows:
p(β |y,pi ,σ 2,τ 2)
=
p(y|β ,pi ,τ 2)p(β |pi ,τ 2)p(pi )p(τ 2)∫
p(y|β,pi ,τ 2)p(β |pi ,τ 2)p(pi )p(τ 2)dβ
=
p(y|β,pi ,τ 2)p(β |pi ,τ 2)∫
p(y|β ,pi ,τ 2)p(β |pi ,τ 2)dβ
(16)
Expanding as done before by introducing the normalizing con-
stant, we get
p(β |y,pi ,σ 2,τ 2)
=
1
Z
(2piσ 2)− n2 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − Xβ)T (y − Xβ)
)
(2piσ 2τ 2)− 12
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2τ 2
β2
)
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − Xβ)T (y − Xβ) − 1
2σ 2τ 2
β2
)
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
[yT y − 2βTXT y + βTXTXβ] − 1
2σ 2τ 2
β2
)
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 12
[
− 2βTXT y 1
σ 2
+ βTXTX
1
σ 2
β +
1
σ 2τ 2
β2
] )
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 12
[
βT
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
)
β − 2βTXT y 1
σ 2
] )
(17)
Completing the squares trick leads us to
p(β |y,pi ,σ 2,τ 2)
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 12
(
β −
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
XT y
1
σ 2
)T
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
) (
β −
(
XTX
1
σ 2
+ I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
XT y
1
σ 2
)) (18)
Since this is the kernel of a Gaussian distribution, we can now
sample all βi ’s as follows
βi |y,pii ,σ 2,τ 2 ∼

δ0 ,pii = 0
N
((
XTX 1σ 2 + I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1
XT y 1σ 2 ,(
XTX 1σ 2 + I
1
σ 2τ 2
)−1)
,pii = 1
(19)
Sampling pi
e individual pij ’s are conditionally independent given θ . We com-
pare two cases: one when the jth element of β is zero or pij is zero
and the other when pij=1. We denote by pi−j the state of the vari-
ables barring j . Let pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ ∼ Bern(ζj ). Let a =
p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ ) and b = pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ .
en
ζj =
a
a + b
(20)
We then draw pij from a Bernoulli with a chance parameter ζj and
we repeat this for all predictors βj . For the case when pii = j = 0,
p(pij = 0|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
p(y|pij = 0,pi−j , β−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )p(β−j |pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
p(pi |θ )p(θ )p(τ 2)p(σ 2)
=
1
Z
p(y|pij = 0,pi−j , β−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )p(pi |θ )
=
1
Z
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − X−jβ−j )T (y − X−jβ−j )
)
(1 − θ )
(21)
where we have absorbed all the irrelevant terms into Z , the
normalizing constant. e expression for pij = 1 can be wrien
similarly except that it would require integration over βj . We have
p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
p(y|pij = 1,pi−j , β−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )p(pi |θ )
=
1
Z
∫
p(y|pij = 1,pi−j , β−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )p(pi |θ )dβj
=
1
Z
θ (2piσ 2τ 2)− 12
∫
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − Xβ)T (y − Xβ)
− 1
2σ 2τ 2
β2j
)
dβj
(22)
To simplify the calculation, we dene Z = y − X−jβ−j as the
residuals of the regression y on X−j . erefore Equation 22 can be
simplied to
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p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
θ (2piσ 2τ 2)− 12
∫
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
n∑
i=1
(zi − βjxi )2
− 1
2σ 2τ 2
β2j
)
dβj
=
1
Z
θ (2piσ 2τ 2)− 12 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
zT z
)
∫
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
[
− 2βj
n∑
i=1
zixi + β
2
j
n∑
i=1
x2i
]
−
1
2σ 2τ 2
β2j
)
dβj
(23)
On completing the squares for obtaining a Gaussian kernel, we
have
p(pij = 1|y, β−j ,pi−j ,σ 2,τ 2,θ )
=
1
Z
θ (2piσ 2τ 2)− 12 exp
(
− 1
2σ 2
(y − X−jβ−j )T (y − X−jβ−j )
)
exp
( (∑ni=1 xizi )2
2σ 2(∑ni=1 x2i + 1τ 2 )
) (24)
e conditional posterior of pi = 0 is therefore a Bernoulli distri-
bution with chance parameter
1 − ζj = 1 − θ
(σ 2τ 2)− 12 exp(K)
(
σ 2
(∑ni=1 x 2i + 1τ 2 )
) 1
2
θ + (1 − θ ) (25)
where K = (
∑n
i=1 xizi )2
2σ 2(∑ni=1 x 2i + 1tau2 ) and where zj changes depending
on which βj we sample.
